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INTRODUCTION 
 
States have long expressed some resistance towards granting the right of 
self-determination to identifiable groups of people within their boundaries. 
This includes the granting of the right to minorities and to indigenous groups. 
One of the ways in which this reluctance reveals itself is in States‟ resistance 
to the granting of recognition of “peoples” to certain groups. States, it would 
seem, draw the erroneous conclusion that recognition of groups as “peoples” 
under international law will inexorably lead to such “peoples” asserting a 
right to self-determination and with that an unfettered ability to secede from 
the state. However states‟ fear of indigenous secession has no realistic basis. 
Yet states continually resist the idea of indigenous self-determination.  
Why has such an interpretation taken hold as an accepted normative 
doctrine of international law? States, apparently fearing for their territorial 
integrity (and perhaps for the natural and other resources within certain land), 
resist recognising groups as “peoples”.1 As this article discusses, however, the 
fear that indigenous groups would seek secession from the state upon being 
recognised as “peoples” is groundless. To understand the recognition of a 
group as “peoples” and the principle of self-determination in this manner is 
fundamentally inaccurate. This article posits that states fear of losing 
territorial integrity through indigenous secession is not at the heart of state 
resistance to indigenous self-determination. Rather, the resistance of states to 
indigenous self-determination is located in another source – modern state 
identity as liberal states.  
Indigenous self-determination is at odds with in particular Jacobin forms 
of liberal statehood in particular
2
 and arguably, that is the real root of state 
                                                   
  Dr Sarah Sargent, Lecturer at Law, University of Buckingham.  
 Dr Graham Melling, Lecturer at Law, University of Buckingham. 
1 The recognition of groups as “peoples” in international law has occurred a limited 
number of times since 1945.  
2 A Jacobin form of liberal statehood is reflective of how a state does with plurality 
among its members. As discussed below at footnotes 64 and 65 and accompanying 
text, a Jacobin form of statehood emphasises loyalty and identification with the state 
rather than with ethnic or other groups within the state. W Safran explains that 
“Jacobin doctrine...emphasized a highly centralized state and rejected both 
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resistance not only to indigenous self-determination but to all indigenous 
rights norms that are seen as a threat to liberal statehood. State resistance to 
the principle of self-determination in the United Nations Declaration on 
Indigenous Rights (UNDRIP)
3
 reveals on-going state unease over granting 
collective “hard” rights under international law. Even though the recognition 
of the right of self-determination within the UNDRIP gives rise to a “hard” 
right, such recognition is as much symbolic as giving rise to concrete practical 
outcomes, such as secession. International law as yet has not extended that far 
and for practical considerations is unlikely to do so. Accommodation by 
states, however, of indigenous rights means a reformulation of state identity 
away from modern Jacobin liberalism – something states view as deeply 
threatening. Therefore it is unlikely to occur.  
 
STATE RESISTANCE TO INDIGENOUS SELF-
DETERMINATION 
 
There is a widespread view that sees any international recognition of a 
particular group as a “peoples” brings with it an immediate access to all of the 
actions embodied within the principle of self-determination. A group with 
access to self-determination is seen as having an immediate and incontestable 
right to secede from the state to create its own independent state. State 
resistance to indigenous self-determination is often presented as being lodged 
in this commonly held, but inaccurate, perception of the normative content of 
the principle of self-determination.
4
  
                                                                                                                         
institutional and ethnocultural pluralism.” W Safran “Pluralism and Multiculturalism 
in France: Post Jacobin Transformations” (2003) 118(3) Political Science Quarterly 
437 at 438.  
3 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was approved 
by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 September 2007, A/Res/61/295, 
available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/512/07/PDF/N0651207.pdf?OpenElement. 
Accessed 1st September 2012. 
4 M Davis comments: „Self-determination for indigenous peoples was still viewed by 
many states as synonymous with decolonisation and a threat to the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of states.‟ She refers to this interpretation of the principle of self-
determination as „the dominant decolonisation construct.‟ M Davis “Indigenous 
Struggles in Standard Setting: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 at 21. See 
also J Castellino “Territorial Integrity and the „Right‟ to Self-Determination: An 
Examination of the Conceptual Tools” (2008) 33(2) Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law 499 at 511, commenting: “The General Assembly explained that self-
determination was a decolonization process...” and further: “Many classify the right to 
self-determination as a norm of jus cogens, even though the phrasing of the [Friendly 
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State expression of resistance to indigenous self-determination through 
opposition to the UNDRIP is only the latest in a consistent chain of events 
where states resist the merest reference to indigenous groups as “peoples”. 
There is nothing new or unique in state positionality on the UNDRIP and its 
self-determination content. Throughout the indigenous rights movement in the 
international community, states have been reluctant to recognise indigenous 
groups as “peoples”. This reluctance has also been expressed in state positions 
regarding minority groups and self-determination.
5
 
This was evident in state resistance to the idea of indigenous groups being 
referenced as “peoples” during the revisions of International Labour 
Convention 107. ILO Convention 107 was criticised as being too 
assimilationist in its content and in need of revision to reflect the 
contemporary thinking that assimilation as an appropriate policy for states to 
pursue.
6
 The revisions that were made to ILO Convention No 107 resulted in 
a new convention, ILO Convention NO 169 in 1989. 
7
 Gone were the 
provisions that were seen to present a very paternalistic and assimilationist 
approach towards indigenous rights. The ILO Convention No 169 instead 
presented an entirely new approach towards indigenous peoples in 
international law. Lee Swepston comments that ILO Convention No 169: 
 
“...adopts an attitude of respect for the cultures and ways of life of 
indigenous and tribal peoples. It presumes their right to continued 
existence and to development along lines they themselves wish. The 
                                                                                                                         
Declaration] itself clearly limits application of the doctrine to decolonization...”, at 
512. See also discussion on the drafting of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples at section 3 below. See also S Wiessner “Indigenous 
Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1141 at 
1159-1162 on how state fears of indigenous secession through self-determination 
delayed an approval vote in the United Nations General Assembly. See also S J 
Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 
2004) pp 59-60, commenting that in relation to ILO Convention No 169, “State 
governments, however, resisted, use of the term peoples because of its association 
with the term self-determination....which in turn has been associated with a right of 
independent statehood.” At 60, emphasis in the original.  
5 For a general discussion see S Sargent “Transnational Networks and United Nations 
Human Rights Structural Change: the Future of Minority and Indigenous Rights” 
(2012) 16(1) The International Journal of Human Rights 123 at 136-139.  
6 Anaya, above n 4, pp 58-59. 
7 Ibid, p 59. See also L Swepston “A New Step in the International Law on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: ILO Convention No 160 of 1989” (1990) 3(15) 
Oklahoma City University Law Review 677 at 687-689.  
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convention also provides...for the right of these peoples to be involved 
in the decision-making process as it affects them.”8  
 
Yet, states remained very wary about a broader grant of international 
rights to indigenous groups. This is reflected in two ways. Firstly, the ILO 
Convention 169 is hard law–that is, it is binding upon states in contrast to the 
soft and non-binding law of the UNDRIP. This may account for the reluctance 
of states to ratify this instrument, despite its high profile in international law.
9
 
States remain wary of agreeing to indigenous rights that can be classified as 
“hard rights.”10 A binding international law instrument would certainly fall 
into the class of “hard rights.” Secondly, despite a reference to indigenous 
groups as “peoples” within ILO 169, that designation is given with a strong 
disclaimer. Preambular language makes reference to “indigenous peoples” 
and to “indigenous and tribal peoples” in several places.11 The body of the 
instrument itself is quick to dispel that this is in any way a grant of 
recognition as “peoples” under international law. Article 1(3) unequivocally 
states:  
 
“The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed 
as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to 
the term under international law.”12  
 
The same resistance towards the use of the word “peoples” arose in 
debates over the naming of the newly created United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII).
13
 The creation of the forum itself was 
seen as a victory. The forum was permanent in nature and was the first UN 
                                                   
8 Ibid, 690.  
9 Only 20 number of states have ratified this instrument as of 1 September 2012. 
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed on 
1st September 2012.  
10 S Lightfoot argues that indigenous rights and the compliance of states with these 
rights can be analysed in part by dividing rights into “hard” and “soft” rights, with 
states more likely to comply with those rights deemed as “soft.” She lists “hard rights” 
as including “land rights and self-determination” while soft rights include “language, 
culture, religion...” S Lightfoot, “Emerging International Indigenous Rights Norms 
and „Over-Compliance‟ in New Zealand and Canada” (2010) 62(1) Political Science 
84 at 104.  
11 International Labour Organisation Convention No 169. 
12 International Labour Organisation Convention No 169, Article 1(3).  
13 Sargent, above n 5, 123,139.  
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forum to be specifically focused on indigenous issues.
14
 It took nearly 10 
years for the forum to be created from its first recommendation in 1993 to 
official recognition by UN Resolution in 2002.
15
 Prior to this however a 
disagreement arose over the name.
16
 But opponents of indigenous self-
determination opposed such a designation of a forum for indigenous 
“peoples”, fearing that even referencing indigenous groups as “peoples” in a 
forum would be an avenue for indigenous groups to lay claim to the right to 
self-determination.
17
 
Yet again state resistance to the use of the word “peoples” in connection 
with indigenous groups appeared in debates over what to name the United 
Nations Decades for indigenous groups. States resisted the use of the word 
“peoples”, and so the two decades became known as the Decade of 
Indigenous People–but not as “Peoples”.18 The inclusion or not of the final “s” 
on the word may appear to be semantic trifling. But it is far more than that. 
That states oppose the use of the word outside legal instruments – and stand 
against its use in the naming of a forum and in United Nations recognition of 
events – speaks to the very deep-seated nature of state positions on any 
linkage between “indigenous” and “peoples.”  
Yet, as discussed in section 4 of this article, the unrealistic grounding of 
the state fear of indigenous cessation through self-determination must be 
examined. States consistently and relentlessly resist the linkage of 
“indigenous” and “peoples” – for reasons that are no more than a smokescreen 
covering deeper and unstated fears. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 
 
Drafting of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples was a process which was long and drawn out over more than twenty 
years. Both states and indigenous groups contributed to the content of the 
document. The content is notable in that no definition of “indigenous” is 
                                                   
14 Ibid, p 139. See also Anaya, above n 4, pp 219-220; J Corntassel “Partnership in 
Action? Indigenous Political Mobilization and Co-optation During the First UN 
Indigenous Decade (1995-2004)” (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 137 at 138, 148.  
15 Anaya, above n 4, p 219-220; Corntassel, ibid, at 138, 148.  
16 Corntassel, above n 14, at 155.  
17 Ibid, at 155.  
18 S Wiessner “Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and 
International Legal Analysis” (1999) 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal 57 at 101-
102. 
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offered and, secondly, the instrument recognises indigenous groups as 
“peoples” with access accordingly to the principle of self-determination. 
These two issues in concert created and continue to create state resistance to 
indigenous rights at international law. The ILO Convention 169 contains 
some defining characteristics to set out what groups and individuals are 
covered by its provisions.
19
 Despite this inclusion, the Convention also makes 
clear that the idea of “self-identification” is the “fundamental criterion for 
determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply”.20 
In an unexpected late development, as the draft Declaration was headed to 
a scheduled vote in the UN General Assembly, opposition to the content on 
the principle of self-determination was such that potential approval was in 
doubt.
21
 It was only after amendments to the Declaration clarifying that the 
self-determination of indigenous peoples did not permit secession from the 
state that the vote went forward on the floor of the General Assembly.
22
 The 
instrument was amended to include the language of now Article 46 that made 
clear that an exercise of self-determination by indigenous peoples would not 
harm the territorial integrity of states.
23
 In short, the right to self-determination 
provided for in Article 3 of the Declaration was tempered by the language of 
Article 46 to provide for “internal” self-determination - which gives rights 
more akin to self-governance and autonomy within the existing boundaries of 
a state. 
As the last-minute flutter of activity on the Declaration‟s content shows, 
states fear the exercise by indigenous peoples of self-determination in any of 
its many guises. Accordingly States feared that if indigenous groups were 
given recognition in international law as “peoples”24 and thus gained a claim 
                                                   
19 Article 1(a) and (b).  
20 Article 1(2).  
21 Wiessner, above n 5, at 1141, 1159-1162; see also Sargent, above n 5, at 137.  
22 United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/61/295 13 September 2007. 
 http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/512/07/PDF/N0651207.pdf?OpenElement. 
Accessed on 1st September 2012. 
23 Article 46 in relevant part states:  
“1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to 
the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent States.” 
24 For instance, the International Labour Organisation Instrument 169 tempers its use 
of the word “peoples” in the instrument by explaining this use does not suggest access 
to the principle of self-determination.  
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to a legitimate exercise of self-determination in accordance with the principle 
in the UN Charter
25
 and in the joint Article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Political Rights.
26
 Is this, however, a realistic fear of states? Whilst there 
are numerous statements that indigenous peoples do not seek secession from 
states that has not allayed state resistance to indigenous self-determination and 
concomitantly then to international law provisions for indigenous rights. 
 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
The principle of self-determination is clearly established as an important 
principle of international law. It is given clear expression in Article 1(2) and 
55 of the UN Charter; the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Territories and Peoples; the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights;
27
 the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration
28
 and the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe‟s Helsinki Final Act.29 
                                                   
25 Article 1(2) Charter of the United Nations. 
26 Article 1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, GA 
Res 2200A (XXI), UN Doc A/6316 (Dec 16, 1966).  
27 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art. 1, 999 UNTS 171, GA 
Res 2200A (XXI), UN Doc A/6316 (Dec 16, 1966); International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, 933 UNTS 3, GA Res 2200A (XXI), UN 
Doc A/6316 (Dec 16, 1966). 
28 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations GA 
Res 2625, Annex, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No 28), UN doc A/5217, 121 (1970).  
29 The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1st 
August 1975, 14 I L M 1292 (Helsinki Declaration) This states: 
“The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their rights to 
self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant norms of international law 
including those relating to territorial integrity of States. 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all 
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, 
their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue 
as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.” 
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Furthermore this right is firmly entrenched in customary international law.
30
 
The first question to be addressed is, what does self-determination mean? 
The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration defined the right of self-
determination as extending to “all peoples” and: 
 
“By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples 
have the right freely to determine, without external influence, their 
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.”31  
 
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, there is no settled agreement on the 
meaning of self-determination. A good explanation of the meaning of self-
determination is provided by Professor Susanna Mancini who suggests that 
self-determination “roughly”32 equates to:  
 
“the freedom for all peoples to decide their own political, economic 
and social regimes. It is, therefore, both a collective right of peoples to 
decide autonomously the course of their national life and to share 
power equitably, and a right of all individuals to participate fully in 
the political process.”33  
 
Professor Mancini‟s definition provides a nuanced analysis of the concept 
of self-determination taking into account both the collective and individual 
nature of the idea of self-determination. For Professor Mancini the concept of 
self-determination recognises the “collective” in the sense of it providing a 
right for a group of “peoples” to self-determination and the “individual” in 
                                                   
30 Western Sahara Case Advisory Opinion ICJ Rep 1975, 12, para. 56; J Vidmar 
“International Legal Responses to Kosovo‟s Declaration of Independence” (2009) 42 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 779 at 807; R McCorquodale “Self-
Determination: A Human Rights Approach” (1994) 43 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 857 at 858.  
31 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations GA 
Res 2625, Annex, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No.28), UN doc. A/5217, 121 (1970). This 
definition was subsequently re-iterated in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. 
32 S Mancini “Rethinking the Boundaries of Democratic Secession: Liberalism, 
Nationalism, and the Right of Minorities to Self-Determination” (2008) 6 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 553 at 554. 
33 Ibid. 
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that the individual within the group of “peoples” has a right to participation in 
the collective right. With both facets facilitating equal and autonomous 
participation in political, economic and social regimes. Mancini‟s view is 
underpinned by the individual right to participate in the political process 
guaranteed to all “people” under Article 25 ICCPR.34 However, for the 
purposes of self-determination it is the collective right of a group that 
accounts for the doctrine. An individual whilst having his/her right to 
participation in the political process guaranteed under the ICCPR could not 
realistically claim a right to self-determination. However, the guaranteed 
individual rights of people contained in the ICCPR underpin the collective 
rights that are enforced by the doctrine of self-determination.  
Initially the right of self-determination was applied in the colonial context 
becoming a legal norm which could override the related principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
35
 The process of decolonization led to the 
creation of over one hundred states with the principle of self-determination 
playing a central role. The importance of the principle of self-determination 
was highlighted in the International Court of Justice‟s important Namibia 
Opinion
36
 in which the Court concluded: 
 
“In the domain to which the present proceedings relate, the last fifty 
years... have brought important developments. These developments 
leave little doubt that the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the 
self-determination and independence of the peoples concerned.”37 
 
Outside the context of colonialism, however, there has been resistance to 
the suggestion that the right self-determination might have any application, in 
particular on the part of the emerging Third World and Eastern European 
states. Yet, despite such resistance the idea of the right of self-determination 
being applicable outside colonialism has been fostered by a number of 
international declarations and political instruments notwithstanding any 
resistance on the part of some states. Moreover, in 1988 the International Law 
Commission expressed the opinion that the principle of self-determination 
                                                   
34 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 1, 999 UNTS 171, GA Res 
2200A (XXI), UN Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
35
 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples 
GA Res 1514 (XV). December 14, 1960. GAOR 15th Sess, Supp 16, 66. 
36 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
ICJ Rep 1971, 16. 
37 Ibid, 31 paragraph 53. 
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was of universal application.
38
 Therefore, that international law recognises the 
right of all peoples to self-determination is a well-established principle of 
international law.  
The normative meaning of self-determination has been split into two – 
internal and external self-determination. Internal self-determination operates 
within the boundaries of existing states. In particular “as a right of the entire 
population of the State to determine its own political, economic and social 
destiny and to choose a representative government; and, equally, as a right of 
a defined part of the population, which has distinctive characteristics on the 
basis of race or ethnicity, to participate in the political life of the State, to be 
represented in its government and not to be discriminated against.”39 External 
self-determination is an exercise that results in the secession of a group from 
the state, and the establishment of a new independent state. As discussed in 
the following section, the definition of self-determination ultimately approved 
in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was 
that of internal self-determination. It is not often recognised in the context of 
discussions on indigenous rights that internal self-determination is not a 
concept unique to the Declaration or to indigenous rights. 
 
A RIGHT TO EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION?  
 
International law and international practice has provided guidance with 
respect to self-determination. It constitutes a right of an entire population of a 
state to determine its own political and social destiny within a state or as a 
defined peoples which has distinctive characteristics on the basis of race or 
ethnicity, to participate in the political life of the State, to be represented in its 
government and not to be discriminated against. These rights are to be 
exercised within the State in which the population or the ethnic or indigenous 
                                                   
38 M Shaw International Law (Cambridge University Press 2008) p 270; R Higgins 
Problems & Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) p 116; Yearbook of the ILC, 
1988, vol II Part 2, 64: “The principle of self-determination, proclaimed in the Charter 
as a universal principle, had been applied mainly in eradicating colonialism, but there 
were other cases in which it had been and could and should be used. By not tying it 
exclusively to colonial contexts, it would be applied much more widely. In that 
connection, all members of the Commission believed that the principles of self-
determination was of universal application.”  
39 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion) available at http://www.icj- 
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=4, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Yusuf, p 3 paragraph 9. 
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group live, and thus constitute internal rights of self-determination.
40
 Where 
international law provides less coherent guidance is where a “peoples” wish to 
exercise a right of external self-determination. In more recent times minority 
groups within states have sought to claim a right to self-determination and that 
that self-determination entails secession.
41
 This is referred to as “external self-
determination”.42 Claims to external self-determination by a minority group 
are seen as posing a challenge to international law as well as to the liberal 
state and also to the wider community of states. 
43
 
Professor Dame Rosalyn Higgins suggests that the question of whether a 
minority group has a right of external self-determination requires 
understanding “the relationship between self-determination and national 
unity.”44 Contemporary understandings of the normative content of self-
determination after the decolonisation era have emphasised that there is no 
automatic right of a group to secede from the state.
45
 
That self-determination poses no threat to the territorial integrity of the 
state is stressed in the 1970 Friendly Declaration.
46
 This instrument was 
produced towards the end of the era of decolonisation, perhaps prescient of 
the continuing importance that the principle would have in international law. 
The Declaration‟s inclusion of the principle consists of two components.  
First, it employs the principle of territorial integrity as a limit to the scope 
of the right of self-determination.
47
 Thus, a racially or ethnically distinct 
group within a State, even if it qualifies as a peoples for the purposes of self-
determination, does not have the right to unilateral secession simply because it 
wishes to create its own separate State.
48
 The prevailing view amongst States 
                                                   
40 Ibid; see Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and 
Peoples GA Res 1514 (XV). December 14, 1960. GAOR 15
th
 Sess, Supp 16, 66. 
41 Higgins, above n 38, p 121. 
42 Vidmar, above n 30, at 808.  
43 See discussion in section 5 below.  
44 Higgins, above n 38, p 121. 
45 According to Higgins: “The evolving norms on self-determination contained – 
undeniably and consistently – an anxious refrain whereby self-determination is to be 
harnessed to, and not the enemy of, territorial integrity.” Higgins, above n 38, p 121.  
46 According to the Friendly Relations Declaration: “Nothing in the foregoing 
paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and 
thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.” 
47 Vidmar, above n 30, at 808.  
48
 Mancini, above n 32, at 556. 
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is that the availability of such a right would reduce to nothing the territorial 
sovereignty and integrity of States and would lead to interminable conflicts 
and chaos, as evidenced by the dissolution of the former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. There is no general right under international law or international 
practice which entitles any ethnically or racially distinct group within an 
existing state to claim a right to secede from the metropolitan state.  
Secondly, however, the Friendly Declaration may be understood to 
suggest that under certain circumstances the territorial integrity limitation on 
the right of self-determination will not arise.
49
 Put another way, while self-
determination should normally be enjoyed and exercised inside the existing 
framework of states, are there circumstances which would exceptionally 
legitimise secession? It is clear that the wish of a group to secede from the 
metropolitan state – whether to form their own independent state or to join 
another state – will be at its most intense where their human rights have been 
infringed and suppressed.
50
 Higgins is of the view that minorities do not have 
a “right” of self-determination and in effect have no “right” to secession.51  
According to Professor James Crawford, however, the key consideration 
is how the minority group has been treated by the metropolitan state:  
 
“The question is whether... a State that does not conduct itself in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples; e.g., in the case of total denial to a particular group or people 
within the State any role in their own government, either through their 
own institutions or the general institutions of the state. At least it is 
arguable that, in extreme cases of oppression, international law allows 
remedial secession to discrete peoples within a State, and that the 
„safeguard clause‟ in the Friendly Relations Declaration ... recognize 
this even if indirectly.”52 
 
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference Re Secession of 
Quebec case took the opportunity to address these implications. In particular, 
it considered whether “when a people is blocked from meaningful exercise of 
its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to 
exercise it by secession.”53 The Court declared “international law expects that 
the right to self-determination will be exercised by the peoples within the 
                                                   
49 Vidmar, above n 30, at 808.  
50 Higgins, above n 38, p 124. 
51 Ibid, p 124. 
52 J Crawford The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2006), p 118. 
53 Reference Re Secession of Quebec (1998) 115 ILR 536. 
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framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance 
of the territorial integrity of those states.”54 The Court went on to say that the 
right of external self-determination, that is secession, “arises only in the most 
extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances”..55  
Antonio Cassese suggests somewhat controversially that such 
circumstances might be where the group in question is subject to “extreme 
and unremitting persecution” combined with the “lack of any reasonable 
prospect for reasonable challenge”.56 The conclusion to be drawn from both 
international law and international practice is that there is little support for the 
application of self-determination as conferring the right of identifiable groups 
within a state to secede from a metropolitan state outside the colonial 
context.
57
  
 
STATE RESISTANCE TO INDIGENOUS RIGHTS  
 
If there is little to no real possibility of indigenous self-determination 
being exercised to secede from the state, just why it is that states raised 
objections to self-determination in the Declaration? In focusing on the 
positionality of the four states voting against approval of the Declaration
58
, 
this article argues that the state objection was not due to any actual fear of 
self-determination resulting in indigenous efforts to secede from the state. 
Rather, the objection was to self-determination as one of the class of “hard”59 
rights granted to a collective.
60
  
States have exhibited an extreme response to the idea of indigenous self-
determination – even though the likelihood of any feared threat of indigenous 
secession is thought to be nearly zero. The threat of secession is more of an 
imagined fear than a real and potential threat to state territorial integrity. It is 
not the thought of indigenous groups having some level of control over their 
own political and cultural affairs which states are reacting to when they 
express resistance to the notion of indigenous self-determination. States have 
                                                   
54 Ibid, 582. 
55 (1998) 115 ILR 536, 584. 
56 A Cassese Self-Determination of Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1995), p 120. 
57 Crawford, above n 52, p 127. 
58 Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.  
59 See section 2 above.  
60 See generally S Lightfoot “Selective Endorsement without Intent to Implement: 
Indigenous Rights and the Anglosphere” (2012) 16(1) The International Journal of 
Human Rights 110. 
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expressed similar although perhaps more muted concerns about concepts of 
indigenous autonomy and self-government. 
61
 
The close relationship between indigenous internal self-determination and 
autonomy is expressed in the final and approved version of the UNDRIP. 
Article 4 explains that autonomy is itself is an exercise of the right to self-
determination. Article 4 provides that indigenous autonomy is granted in 
“internal and local affairs...”62 through an exercise of self-determination.  
Some researchers have hypothesised that state resistance to any form of 
indigenous self-government, autonomy or self-determination is rooted in roots 
of state policies of assimilation. While these policies have largely been 
abandoned at least officially, it must be questioned whether the abandonment 
has reached levels of practice as opposed to official rhetoric. Notions of 
indigenous autonomy are at odds with assimilation and might be viewed by 
states as being a part of the state itself. 
63 
 
This perceived rejection of the state may in turn fuel state rejection of 
self-determination, where indigenous self-determination is seen as being at 
odds and a threat to state identity as liberal state where individual rather than 
group autonomy is one of the core defining values.
64
 This is particularly true 
of the Jacobin form of liberal states where  
 
“loyalty to the state and the so-called state-nation [is]... more 
important than loyalty to subgroups. The ideal of equality, also 
implies cultural equality, that is the eradication of all forms of cultural 
differentiation.”65 
 
Thus, indigenous claims to rights to differentiate themselves from the 
state and simultaneously to call upon the state to promote and safeguard those 
rights causes a crisis of identity for Jacobin liberal states.  
The threat to state identity is not only one of a perceived threat to 
territorial integrity, but of the spectre of a clearly distinct indigenous polity 
within the state boundaries that states must both ensure are included and yet 
are able to maintain their distinctness. 
66
 Despite that potential threat, Daes 
observes:  
                                                   
61 Ibid, Table 1, 117-118. 
62 Article 4, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  
63 H Hannum “New Developments in Indigenous Rights” (1988) 28 Virginia Journal 
of International Law 649 at 657.  
64 See E Bornman “National Symbols and Nation Building in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa” (2006) 30 International Journal of Intercultural Relations 383.  
65 Ibid, at 386.  
66 See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in particular 
Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 16, 17, 19, 33 and 38. 
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“...although few governments are yet prepared to concede the right to 
self-determination to Indigenous Peoples, most of them have already 
accepted the subsidiary or substitute right of internal self-
government.”67 
 
Just what level of acceptance this “substitute” principle has been given is 
suspect, given the continued state resistance to a full domestic implementation 
of all of the UNDRIP.
68
 Yet Daes is at pains to explain that the form that 
indigenous autonomy would take is not the sort that would provide any real 
threat to even Jacobin liberal state identity.  
 
“The goal is neither complete independence of Indigenous Peoples nor 
the kind of local autonomy which would lead to social or political 
isolation and continuing vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples. What 
most Indigenous Peoples seek, and the United Nations has so far 
endorsed, is a hybrid of autonomy. Indigenous Peoples must be able to 
participate effectively in the decision affecting their destiny at all 
levels, enjoying a large measure of control over their internal affairs, 
and in equitable sharing of power in national politics.”69 
 
Some measure of integration with the state is arguably then beneficial to 
indigenous groups, and as noted, the UNDRIP creates an obligation for states 
to ensure that indigenous individuals and groups are not isolated from the 
state. Lightfoot‟s chart 70 again reveals the expression of state uneasiness with 
the concepts of internal self-government. This is demonstrated by the state 
stance that the UNDRIP is only aspirational and not binding, thus not 
evincing any requirements that the state actually do anything to enact the 
UNDRIP content.
71
 Alternatively there is insistence that the state‟s laws and 
policies are already in compliance with UNDRIP, again meaning that the state 
must not take any action to enact UNDRIP.
72
 To take action that gave 
credence to separate and distinct communities would be a threat to the Jacobin 
form of the liberal state. That would shift the state form to that of the 
syncretistic state where:  
 
                                                   
67 E A Daes “The Concepts of Self-Determination and Autonomy of Indigenous 
Peoples in the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 
(2001) 14 St Thomas Law Review 259 at 269. 
68 See Lightfoot, above n 60, at 110.  
69 Daes, above n 67, at 269. Emphasis in original.  
70 Lightfoot, above n 60, Table 1 at 117-118. 
71 Ibid. 
72
 Lightfoot, above n 60, Table 1, at 117-118.  
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“...ethnic, racial and other groupings [are] the building blocks of a 
larger unity and involves policies of multiculturalism that guarantee 
the cultural rights of ethnic or other minorities.”73 
 
State acceptance of indigenous rights is in itself not an either-or choice. It 
is not a simple matter of a state either rejecting or accepting rights. There are 
varying levels of acceptance and effectiveness that states give to any 
international norm within domestic law, policy and institutions. The varying 
levels of acceptance are referred to as “normative salience.” Different scales 
measuring the level of normative salience have been developed, with one of 
the most detailed being that developed by Loren Cass.
74
 His eight level scale 
indicates state responses from explicit rejection of a norm to such acceptance 
that the norm has a “taken-for-granted”75 quality within domestic institutions, 
law and policy.
 76
 
                                                   
73 Bornman, above n 64, at 386.  
74 L Cass The Failures of American and European Climate Policy: International 
Norms, Domestic Politics and Unachievable Commitments (State University of New 
York Press, Albany, 2006).  
75 Ibid, p 10.  
76
 “1. Irrelevance: National leaders do not acknowledge the emergent international 
norm in any way, and it is not a part of the foreign or domestic policy dialogue. 
National leaders do not even feel compelled to justify actions that contravene the 
proposed norm.  
“2. Rejection: National leaders acknowledge a proposed norm but reject it. The state 
will likely support an alternative norm and engage in debate with supporters of the 
less desirable alternative. The dialogue is conducted primarily on the international 
stage, and the normative debate has not entered mainstream domestic political 
dialogue.  
“3. Domestic Relevance: National leaders continue to reject the proposed 
international norm, but it has entered the domestic political dialogue. At this point the 
government faces pressure from both international and domestic actors to affirm the 
emergent norm.  
“4. Rhetorical Affirmation: National leaders affirm the international norm as a result 
of political pressure from within and/or internationally. The norm is now a part of the 
domestic and foreign policy dialogue, but it has not been translated into foreign or 
domestic policy changes. 
“5. Foreign Policy Impact: National leaders adjust the state‟s foreign policy to affirm 
the norm and may support its inclusion in international agreements. The change in 
position may be the result of persuasion of the appropriateness of the emergent norm 
or through domestic and/or international coercion. However, national leaders continue 
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The question arises as to why states are motivated to internalise 
international norms at any level. Scholars have offered very similar views as 
to why states adhere to international norms within their domestic institutions 
and laws. Given that international law is sometimes presented as an obligation 
voluntarily taken on by states, from that viewpoint it might seem reasonable 
to assume that states comply with international norms because they want to. 
But, in fact, it is not so simple as that. The conception of international law as a 
body of voluntary state members is contested. Other conceptions include the 
international community is one of power and politics, where in an age of 
globalisation, membership and a good reputation are necessary to receive 
favourable treatment in the international community across a range of 
activities from bank loans to trade arrangements.
77
 Accordingly, the factors 
that affect whether that states do- and do not – achieve high normative 
salience for any particular international norm are complex.  
Alexander Wendt argues there are three reasons for states to adhere to 
international norms within their domestic laws and institutions: “because they 
are forced to, because it is in their self-interest, and because they perceive the 
norms to be legitimate.”78 
                                                                                                                         
to reject changes in domestic policy to implement the norm‟s behavioral imperatives, 
or domestic actors continue to reject the norm and block domestic changes required 
by the norm.  
“6. Domestic Policy Impact: National leaders and other actors begin to justify changes 
in domestic policy on the basis of the international norm. At this point, the policy 
changes typically serve other purposes as well, but the norm provides additional 
justification for the changes. The norm is fully embedded in the domestic political 
dialogue, but the onus is still on the supporters of the norm to justify policy changes 
that may adversely affect domestic interest groups.  
“7. Norm Prominence: Domestic interest groups that wish to continue policies or 
pursue new initiatives that contradict the norm must now justify the violation of the 
norm. The burden of proof has shifted and the norm is becoming embedded in the 
domestic institutional structures and policies of the state. 
“8. Taken for Granted: The norm has become embedded in the domestic institutional 
structure of the state, and compliance with the norm is nearly automatic.” Cass, above 
n 74, pp 9-10. 
77 See O Hathaway “Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of 
International Law” (2005) 72 University of Chicago Law Review 469, and in 
particular her discussion on “collateral benefits” for states in joining a human rights 
treaty at 474 at 507-511.  
78 A Wendt Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 
1999) 250.  
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This is consistent with the Cass scale, where different levels of normative 
salience are reached in response to political pressure, domestic and 
international advocacy, and the interest of the state. Many norms are given 
effect because a state determines that the norms are legitimate.
79
 Yet, as 
Wendt points out, not all norms are internalised by a state on the basis of 
being seen as legitimate. A state might internalise a norm that it views to be in 
conflict with its own values or identity, but does so because of political 
expedience (which Wendt expresses as in the self interest of the state) or 
through compulsion. State resistance to the norm of indigenous self-
determination can be examined through understanding its place on the scale of 
normative salience and on state expressions for accepting or resisting the 
norm.  
Cass points out: “… domestic institutional structures, political culture and 
historically contingent choices will be critical intervening variables in the 
translation of international norms into domestic policy.”80 A high level of 
salience cannot be achieved without these changes in not only laws, but 
domestic institution and policy as well. 
81
 Provisions of the UNDRIP will not 
be effective unless given high salience at the domestic level – something that 
is highlighted in comments made by the current United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on indigenous issues, Professor James Anaya:  
 
“For the Declaration to be fully operative, States must pursue a range 
of affirmative, special measures that engage the various institutions of 
law-making and public administration. This involves a complex 
process of legal and institutional reform, judicial action, specific 
policies, and special reparation procedures. It is a process that 
requires States’ full political engagement and financial commitment, 
and which is not free from obstacles and difficulties of all sorts.”82  
 
Real change within domestic institutions and policies has to occur in order 
to achieve that level of salience that gives effect and access to Declaration 
rights at the domestic level. 
83
 
                                                   
79 J Brunee and S Toope “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an 
Interactional Theory of International Law” (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 20  
80 Ibid, p 2.  
81 Cass, above n 74.  
82 A/HRC/9/9/9 (n 2) para 87. Emphasis added.  
83 Anaya‟s comment: “Implementing the Declaration will normally require or may be 
facilitated by the adoption of new laws or the amendment of existing legislation at the 
domestic level.... Also normally required will be new regulatory frameworks, which 
in most countries are still lacking or are insufficient. It is important to note that the 
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Sheryl Lightfoot argues that states indorse indigenous rights for a variety 
of political reasons. Her research points to the changing positions of the four 
“no-states” which have all subsequently changed their opposition to the 
UNDRIP to one of at least rhetorical support. However, even in voicing 
support for the UNDRIP, all four of the states continue to express opposition 
to some of the rights within the UNDRIP, including its self-determination 
provisions, albeit those have been limited to internal self-determination and 
the ability of an indigenous group locating the right to secede from the state 
nullified by Article 46 of the UNDRIP. 
84
 States are willing to endorse 
indigenous “soft rights”85 such as “language and culture”86 at the same time 
that there is a rejection of rights seen as “hard rights”87 that states believe 
“would threaten the liberal framework and the sovereignty status quo.”88 
Lightfoot indicates that those norms which are seen by the state as threatening 
to liberal states are rejected, a view that is also given by Hale in his 
assessment of variance in state acceptance of some but rejection of other 
indigenous norms.
89
 Hale notes the indigenous norms which states are 
receptive to: “language, politics, spirituality, intellectual production and 
educational reform” 90 Those rights that are compatible with the identity of a 
liberal state are endorsed – those that threaten it are rejected – and those that 
threaten it are invariably those that provide for “widespread collective 
empowerment.” 91 
Certainly, the right of self-determination, whether cast as internal or 
external, is within that class of rights that are both collective and empowering. 
Self-determination for indigenous groups is thus rejected and resisted by the 
state. The state sees the grant of self-determination as threatening to its very 
                                                                                                                         
legal and institutional transformations required by the Declaration are usually not 
sufficiently addressed by enacting specific “indigenous laws”, as many States have 
done, but rather will normally also involve the transformation of broader legal 
structures in key areas. A/HRC/9/9 11 August 2008 Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people. 
Emphasis added.  
84 Article 46, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  
85 Lightfoot, above n 10, at 103. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89
 C Hale “Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the 
Politics of Identity in Guatemala” (2002) 34 Journal of Latin American Studies 485 at 
520.  
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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existence – not in terms of an actual secession of territory, but to its identity in 
liberalism, because the idea of collective rights is an anathema to the liberal 
nature of the state‟s existence, and collective rights which empower a group. 
That there is no real likelihood of an effort of an indigenous group to secede 
from the state, and that modern international law is not supportive of the 
existence of such a right, does not temper state resistance to the notion of 
indigenous self-determination. State resistance is not located in the fear of 
secession. The fear and resistance to indigenous self-determination is at a 
more abstract level, seen as a threat to the form and identity of the state itself 
due to the nature of the right – not that the right might ever be exercised.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As this analysis demonstrates, modern international law would provide 
little support for indigenous groups to exercise a right to secession from the 
metropolitan state. This is unlikely to be seen as a legitimate exercise of the 
right to external self-determination. The right to secede from the state is 
available in only limited circumstances. The right to even external self-
determination does not carry with it an automatic right to secede from the 
state. But state resistance to indigenous self-determination in the UNDRIP 
was not grounded in a poor understanding of international law. It is difficult to 
fathom that all four “no-states” were misinformed on the international law‟s 
view on the very narrow circumstances in which a right to secede from the 
state can be exercised with approval and acceptance from the international 
community.  
This raises a question as to why states positioned themselves in opposition 
to the provision of a right to self-determination to indigenous groups. Rather 
than a well-founded fear that indigenous groups would in fact exercise this to 
secede from metropolitan states, this is in fact reflective of the resistance that 
states have to a class of rights that they deem to be too empowering to 
indigenous groups and thus threatening to the relationship of state dominance 
and domestic control of indigenous groups. A move of indigenous rights from 
domestic to international rights threatens to displace states from a position of 
unchallenged control over indigenous groups and individuals within their 
borders. The displacement of the state may again be more symbolic than real, 
as the UNDRIP is heavily focused on state provision of rights to indigenous 
peoples, for all that it is a document of international law. But even to that end, 
state resistance demonstrates that there is a lack of real acceptance of the 
international law principles of self-determination and autonomy to replace the 
domestic principles, laws and policies of assimilation. State acceptance of 
indigenous rights is both reluctant and piecemeal. Accepting “hard rights” for 
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indigenous groups and giving them a high level of salience within domestic 
frameworks would mean a wholesale change in state identity.  
This means that the “no-state” resistance to an effective recognition of 
indigenous rights within their domestic frameworks is entrenched and will be 
difficult to overcome. An examination of state positionality on indigenous 
self-determination reveals that behind state rhetoric and explanation lays a 
much more complex set of reasons – reasons steeped in state identity and the 
view of indigenous rights as a threat to a liberal state identity.  
Given that states view that highly salient indigenous rights pose a risk to 
state identity, it is unlikely that the stance that states have taken regarding 
indigenous self-determination will change. Only a reformation of state 
identity from Jacobin liberalism to a syncretistic form of multiculturalism is 
likely result in state acceptance of other than notional and aspiration rights for 
indigenous peoples. 
 
